In order to better understand life, it is helpful to look beyond the envelop of life as we know it. A simple model of coevolution was implemented with the addition of a gene for the mutation rate of the individual. This allowed the mutation rate itself to evolve in a lineage. The model shows that when the individuals interact in a sort of zero-sum game, the lineages maintain relatively high mutation rates. However, when individuals engage in interactions that have greater consequences for one individual in the interaction than the other, lineages tend to evolve relatively low mutation rates. This model suggests that di erent genes may have evolved di erent mutation rates as adaptations to the varying pressures of interactions with other genes.
The Possibilities of Life
Lewontin suggested that when we think about what life could be, rather than what we see before us, there are two dimensions that might be considered: mortality and heredity. 27] The life with which we are most familiar is mortal and reproduces with high delity. But why not mortal organisms that pass on little information to their o spring? For that matter, why not immortal organisms with varying degrees of hereditary transmission of information? This paper is an attempt to address one aspect of these questions, the evolution of mutation rates. Neither mortality nor heredity need be dichotomous qualities. Mortality might range over varying degrees of longevity. Heredity can be addressed This work was supported in part by the generosity of the MIT AI Lab. I am greatful to R. Brooks, H. Westerho , M. Donoghue, P. Goss, K. Rice and L. King for their comments and support. M. Maley deserves special recognition for his time and e orts to untangle the mysteries of this model. I could not have completed the project without him. through varying rates of mutation. At one extreme, the lack of mutation is like Charybdis. It is an absorbing boundary such that if a lineage ever evolves a complete lack of mutation, it will never escape its current state. Unfortunately for a lineage stuck in such a stasis, both the abiotic and biotic environment change over time. It is unlikely that a static lineage would be able to survive long in the real world, even if it were possible to evolve a complete lack of mutation. At the other extreme, a high mutation rate is a Scylla which will tear apart any genetic adaptations of the parent to produce an almost totally random o spring. In order to evolve adaptations, a lineage must happen to avoid both extremes.
Modi er Genes and the Reduction Principle
Any gene that a ects the mutation rate of other genes is a modi er gene. That is, the mutation rate gene e ects transmission and is not directly under selective pressure except to the extent that the genes it modi es are under selective pressure. According to the \evolutionary reduction principle" 12, 28, 1] an invading allele for the modi er gene should only succeed if it increases the delity of transmission of the selected gene. In other words, only lower mutation rates should invade.
The modi er gene itself is assumed to have perfect transmission and to produce linear variation in the transmission of the selected loci 1]. Furthermore, selection does not uctuate in these models. If selection is allowed to uxtuate or the population experiences random genetic drift, optimal mutation rates are non-zero 16, 15, 21] . The speci c optimal mutation rate depends at least on parameters for the degree of dominance in the selected gene, the variance and autocorrelation in the environment, and the mean selective di erences between the homozygotes 15]. These models generally do not focus on coevolution. While the environment may uctuate, the selective e ects of the environment are not determined by the population of organisms.
Genetic Algorithms
The evolution of mutation rates has also been studied from an engineering point of view, using genetic algorithms. The challenge is to nd a mutation rate that will allow the population of solutions to converge on the best solution in the shortest amount of time 5, 4, 33, 9, 17, 14] . However, others point out that the optimal mutation rate depends on how a solution is encoded as a genome 39] and the choice of tness function to evaluate a solution. 4] B ack goes as far as to include a gene for mutation rate in each solution in the population. 4] This allows a \schedule" of mutation rates over time. Early on, mutation rates tend to be high. As the population approaches the optimal solution, mutation rates descend. This reduction in mutation rates over time is a common improvement technique in genetic algorithms. 5, 9, 14] Traditional genetic algorithms employ an unrealistically static concept of tness. The \problem" that the lineages are trying to solve in a genetic algorithm does not change over time. That is, the environment of the genetic algorithm is completely static. If we allow the organisms to interact with each other, then the organisms are suddenly immersed in a dynamic, biotic environment. With interactions, there is no longer any single, optimal solution. 1 Would the evolution of mutation rates change under coevolutionary pressures? The following model provides a tool for addressing that question.
The Model
Each organism in a population is explicitly represented in this con guration model. 10, 31, 20] Time is discrete and is organized by \generations." During each generation all of the organisms are allowed to interact in parallel with the other near by organisms in the environment. The form of these interactions is highly abstract, though not as simpli ed as other models of ecosystems 24, 23, 6] , and have been inspired by the ECHO model. 18, 22, 19] 2.1 An Organism An organism consists of three genes: o ense, defense, and mutation. Both the o ense and defense genes consist of eight bits. These are treated solely as bit patterns. They determine the results of an interaction with another organism through matching of the bit patterns as detailed below in Section 2.2.
The gene for mutation is an integer from 0 to 100. The mutation gene codes for the mutation rate of the o ense and defense genes. Initially the model was implemented with the mutation gene coding for the mutation rates of all the genes, including itself 30]. This meant that if the mutation gene ever reached zero, all mutation and all evolution stopped. However, having this absorbing boundary at zero adds a bias to the average mutation rates over time. To avoid this bias, the mutation gene was altered at a xed rate independent its integer value. The qualitative results were not a ected by this change.
Mutation only occurs during reproduction when the parental genes are passed on and then modi ed in the o spring. Mutation is di erent for the integer and bit pattern genes. In the case of the integer gene, mutation, the gene of the o spring di ers randomly from the parental gene along a Poisson distribution centered on the parent's gene with a of 5, as de ned in (1) .
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Here was xed at 5 when the mutation gene itself was being mutated, x is a potential o spring's gene, and parental gene is the gene of the parent that is being transmitted to its o spring. This gives a Poisson distribution around the parental gene. The o spring's gene is truncated at 0 and 100. Mutation of a bit pattern gene depended on the value of the mutation gene of the parent, scaled down via equation (2). = (mutation=50) 3 (2)
The in equation (2), ranging from 0 to 8, was again used in a Poisson distribution. Here is the average number of bits that are ipped in an 8-bit gene during reproduction. This scaling was chosen to give both the full range of possibilities from 0 to 8 and to allow evolution to act on a ne grain of resolution of di erent mutation rates when the rates were low. When the parent's mutation gene is low, the o spring's gene is likely to be very close to the parent's gene. However, when the parent's mutation gene is high, the o spring's gene may vary widely from the parent's gene.
An Interaction
To model an ecosystem, interactions must at the least allow for the full scope of coevolutionary relationships, from mutualism to competition. (3). An organism's tness score is calculated as the sum total of all the interaction scores that organism collected during one generation. Score = o ense-reward (match(o ense(me); defense(opponent))) ?
defense-punishment (match(o ense(opponent); defense(me))) :
A Generation
The population of organisms is organized along a ring 6], so that every organism has exactly one neighbor on either side. A single generation consists of three steps:
1. All the organisms interact with each neighbor on either side. An organism's tness score is the sum of two interaction scores. 2. The organisms with the lowest tness scores are then killed o until only half of the population remains. This simulates the organisms producing twice the carrying capacity of the environment each generation. 3. The remaining half of the population is allowed to reproduce, according to their mutation genes, to ll the empty positions on the ring. Reproduction is asexual. The newborn o spring receives the genes of a single parent, modi ed by that parent's mutation rate gene. Furthermore, reproduction is fair. Each surviving organism gets a turn to reproduce, by order in the ring. The position of the last organism to reproduce in a generation is saved so that reproduction in the next generation starts with the following organism on the ring. Only living organisms are allowed to reproduce.
Missing Complexities
The model includes many simplifying assumptions. Interactions are highly stylized. The tness payo s for the interactions are simple, discrete, linear functions. The environment has a xed carrying capacity and the organism's reproduction rates are assumed to be both identical and high enough to ll the environment beyond the carrying capacity. There are no fatal mutations. A mutation merely changes an organisms interactions with its neighbors or changes its mutation rate. Organisms reproduce asexually. Finally, the organisms lack life histories. An organism that has survived many generations has no a priori competitive advantage over a new born organism.
An Elaboration and A Null Model
The model has a single gene, mutation, that governs the mutation rates of both the o ense and the defense genes. An interesting elaboration involves splitting the single mutation gene into two mutation genes, o ense-mutation and defensemutation. The o ense-mutation gene codes for the mutation rate of the o ense gene, and the defense-mutation gene codes for the mutation rate of the defense gene. Both of the mutation gene are themselves mutated at a xed rate ( = 5).
A null model was also implemented to illuminate any hidden dynamics in the experimental model. The null model was identical to the experimental model except that when an organism interacted with its neighbors, the payo was a random number between 0 and 8, rather than a number generated through the matching of the o ense and defense genes.
Running the Model
When the model is started, all of the genes in the initial population are generated randomly. 2 During the course of the simulation statistics are gathered each generation on the average tness, minimum tness, maximum tness, average mutation rate, average age, and average number of o spring. Finally, at the end of a simulation, the resulting population is saved in a le for later examination.
The Results
In all of the following results the model was run with a population of 200 organisms for 2000 generations. Organisms interacted with their immediate neighbors on either side. The independent variables in the experiment were the o ensereward and defense-punishment parameters.
The initial model, with the single mutation rate gene, was run 50 times under each set of parameter conditions. The elaborated model with two mutation rate genes was run 16 time under each condition. Since the parameters had no a ect on the dynamics of the null model, it was only run for one set of 16 trials.
Mutation Rates
The evolution of mutation rates di ered dramatically depending on the settings of the o ense-reward and defense-punishment parameters. The central results for the basic model are depicted in Fig. 1 .
The mutation rates drop dramatically with the divergence of o ense-reward and defense-punishment. When the average mutation rates are compared for the condition where o ense-reward = defense-punishment = 1 against the condition where the o ense-reward is twice the defense-punishment, the later condition results in signi cantly lower mutation rates (t=6.113, d.f.=76.708, p < 0:001). 3 Simlarly, o ense-reward = 2, defense-punishment = 1 condition resulted in signi cantly higher mutation rates than when the o ense-reward = 5 and the defense-punishment = 2 (t=6.0262, d.f.=74.2, p < 0:001). Furthermore, the o ense-reward = defense-punishment = 1 populations have signi cantly larger mutation rates as compared to the populations in the null model (t=3.7452, d.f.=19.785, p < 0:001). However, once o ense-reward grew to be 2.5 times Figure 1: This is a log 2 -normal plot of the average mutation rates after 2000 times steps as a function of ( o ense-reward defense-punishment ). Each data point represents the average of 50 di erent populations with an error bar at one standard deviation.
defense-punishment, the experimental populations had signi cantly lower mutation rates than the null model populations (t=-5.3156, d.f.=19.258, p < 0:001).
The average mutation rates for the 50 trials in the o ense-reward = defensepunishment = 1 condition cluster in an approximately normal curve. However, the relatively large variances observed in the data for the conditions where o ense-reward defense-punishment is due to a small number of outliers with extremely high average mutation rates.
The model is symmetric around the two parameters. That is, if defensepunishment is twice the o ense-reward then the average mutation rates drop by approximately the same amount. The only di erence is that when defensepunishment is greater than o ense-reward, there is pressure on the lineages to evolve bit pattern genes that mismatch the bit pattern genes of their neighbors. In any case, the average mutation rates decreases as o ense-reward and defensepunishment diverge.
The elaborated model produced the same pattern of results. Fig. 2 shows the average mutation rates for the o ense and defense genes when their rates of mutation are independent. Figure 2 : This is a log 2 -normal plot of the average mutation rates for the two mutation rate gene model and the null model. Except for the \Null Model" curve, each data point represents the average of 16 di erent populations with an error bar at one standard deviation. The \O ense" and \Defense" curves graph the average mutation rates of the two genes that independantly controlled the o ense and defense genes respectively. The \Null Model" curve represents the average mutation rates when tness scores for interactions were completely random. Although the null model is not a ected by the o ensereward and defense-punishment parameters, the data for the 16 populations has been graphed at three di erent points for ease of comparison. The \De-fense" mutation curve has been slightly o set to the right for readability.
Discussion
Game theory 37, 11] provides a useful tool for analyzing the evolution of mutation rates in the model. Why should an inequality in the o ense-reward and defense-punishment parameters lead to the evolution of low mutation rates?
The players in these games are lineages. Each organism in the environment interacts with its two neighbors and the tness value of those interactions form an explicit payo matrix. A \move" in the game happens when an organism reproduces. If the o spring carries a mutation in the o ense or defense genes, the new organism's interactions with the other lineages will be di erent from its parent's interactions. That is, a \move" in the game is a reproduction event with or without a mutation. The lineages play mixed strategies, sometimes mutating at reproduction, and sometimes not, depending on their mutation rates.
The structure of the payo matrix in this coevolutionary game is determined by the o ense-reward and defense-punishment parameters. To simplify the analysis it helps to assume that the lineages are coevolving over time. Of course, there is no guarantee that the next generation in a lineage will interact with the same \player." However, as a small number of lineages come to dominate the environment, the participants in the games will stabilize. The explanatory value of a game theoretic analysis appears to be robust to this simpli cation.
When o ense-reward > defense-punishment and two lineages have tag genes that match well, the lineages engage in an iterated prisoner's dilemna (IPD) regarding the mutation of their defense genes. 3, 2, 34, 32, 7, 8, 35, 40] That is, mutual mutation will result in lower interaction payo s than mutual lack of mutation. Yet, if one lineage mutates and the other doesn't, then the mutant lineage will gain a better payo than mutual lack of mutation while the nonmutant lineage will score worse than mutual mutation. Table 1 illustrates one example of an IPD payo matrix in the model. Table 1 : O ense-reward = 2 and defense-punishment = 1. When lineages 1 and 2 perfectly match, a mutation in the defense gene produces these scores. This is a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Under the same conditions, a mutation in the o ense genes will always lower a lineage's score. The combination of this pressure on the o ense genes and the IPD for the defense genes leads to pressure towards lowering the mutation rates of the lineages. The di erence between mutual mutation and mutual lack of mutation increases as o ense-reward and defense-punishment diverge. Thus, as o ense-reward grows large relative to defense-punishment the pressure to lower mutation rates increases and the lineages can be seen to respond accordingly.
The fact that the mutation gene evolves under the pressures on both the o ense and defense gene suggested an elaboration to the model. Instead of one gene regulating mutation in both the bit pattern genes, a mutation gene was created for each bit pattern gene. The fact that the the defense gene's mutation rate appears higher than the mutation rate for the o ense gene would be expected under conditions where the lineages match each other well, so that a mutation in the defense gene would tend to lower a lineage's score. In contrast, when lineages are well matched, a mutation in a lineage's o ense gene would tend to lower the lineage's score.
High Mutation Rates
The game theoretic analysis fails to illuminate why the symmetric case, where o ense-reward = defense-punishment, results in high mutation rates. In the symmetric case, when organisms match their neighbors, the chance of a benecial mutation to the defense gene is matched by an equal chance for a deleterious mutation to the o ense gene. This balance does not change when we relax the assumptions that organisms match their neighbors. So it would seem the mutation rates of the populations should do a random walk. They should turn out exactly like the null model populations. So why are the mutation rates in the experimental populations signi cantly higher than the mutation rates in the null model populations?
We hypothesized that in the symmetric case, a high mutation rate is advantageous for a lineage in an environment where the average mutation rate of the population is low. Thus, when the random walk of the population wanders into the region of low mutation rates, high mutation rates become selectively advantageous and so the population average bounces back up. Thus the population should do a random walk in the region of high mutation rates with a re ecting boundary at 100 and some sort of soft boundary at low mutation rates. We then designed a series of ecological experiments to test this hypothesis.
Ecological Experiments
To test whether some mutation rates are selected over others, we altered the model so that the mutation rates no longer evolve themselves, but remain xed. We then inoculated the model with two interleaved populations of organisms. One population had a \high" mutation rate and the other had a \low" mutation rate. The o ense and defense genes were set randomly for each individual in both populations. We then ran the model until one of the two populations reached xation. If there was no selective advantage for one of the mutation rates, then each sub-population should reach xation in 50% of the trails.
Ecological Results
When we ran a population of organisms with a mutation rate of 30 with a population of organisms with a mutation rate of 10, 199 out of 200 trails resulted in the mutation = 30 population growing to xation. In contrast, when a population of mutation = 80 organisms was mixed with a population of mutation = 60 organisms, the mutation = 80 population grew to xation in only 96 of 200 trials. This was not a statistically signi cant deviation from the expected 50% of the trials.
Ecological Conclusions
The ecological experiments exactly matched the predictions of our hypothesis. The population seems to be following a random walk between 100 and some elevated lower bound. It remains to be elucidated why a high mutation rate is selectively advantageous for a lineage in a low mutation rate biotic environment. However, we believe the advantage lies in the interaction of a high variance in a lineage with non-linearities in the interactions and spatial structure of the environment. A lineage with a high mutation rate will produce o spring with widely divergent o ense and defense genes. Whereas a lineage with a low mutation rate will produce o spring similar to the parent. This is the equivalent to \putting all of one's eggs in one basket." When the general population wanders into a low average mutation rate, regularities quickly spread through the population. Due to these regularities, it is likely that if any of the low mutators score poorly in their interactions, all of the low mutating o spring will be culled from the population and the lineage will go extinct. In contrast, a lineage with a higher mutation rate is more likely to produce a collection of o spring spanning the range from low to high scoring individuals. Thus, the high mutating lineage is liable to lose a few individuals every generation, but less likely to lose all of its constituent individuals. In this way, the lineage with the higher mutation rate survives to pass on its gene for a high mutation rate. This hypothesis may be supported by Kephart's nding that the addition of spatial structure to a predator-prey model can create large undampted oscillations in the population dynamics 25].
Implications for Biology
The results of the model follow the evolutionary pressures that are applied to the lineages of organisms in the model. But what has this got to do with biology? The dramatic distinction in the model is between the case where o ensereward = defense-punishment and the cases where o ense-reward 6 = defensepunishment. This distinction roughly corresponds to zero-sum games versus non-zero-sum, or mixed-motive games. In more biological terms, the rst case corresponds to interactions where the consequences are roughly the same for each participant. Intraspeci c competition might be a common example. Under this form of interaction, the model predicts that the participants will evolve relatively high mutation rates. The second case corresponds to an interaction where the consequences are signi cantly di erent for the participants. Here the model predicts that the participant lineages will settle down into a mutualis-tic association with relatively low mutation rates. The dinner principle may be a familiar example. The cost/bene t analysis is dramatically di erent for predator and prey, as long as the predator is not on the brink of starvation. The preceding results suggest that such an imbalance in consequences should dampen the pressures in a predator-prey genetic arms races.
Mutation should be understood under this theory as phenotypic variation. Any heritable, causal factor that a ects the similarity of a phenotypic trait between the parent and o spring should be considered as a possible adaptation to the coevolutionary pressures on that trait. In a zero-sum game, the evolution of a relatively high \mutation rate" might be realized through the evolution of a greater sensitivity of the relevant trait to environmental conditions during development. This would produce a lower correlation between the trait of the parent and the trait of the o spring. On the other hand, the evolution of a high phenotypic mutation rate might be realized as a \hot spot" in the genes that in uence the development of the relevant traits.
There is evidence for di erences amongst mutation rates in active genes of mammalian genomes. 41] However, the causal mechanism for these di erences is not yet clear. Filipski suggests that some regions of the genome are replicated by the relatively error-prone DNA polymerase while most others are replicated by the relatively high delity DNA polymerase 13]. In contrast, Wolfe et al. observe that genes are replicated at di erent times during the S phase of the cell cycle. They suggest that the di erences in mutation rate are caused by di erences in dNTP pool conditions at the time that the genes are replicated 41]. These are by no means the only possible explanations for di erences in mutation rates.
The results suggest that di erent forms of interactions put di erent evolutionary pressures on the mutation rates of the participants. Expressed genes should have evolved di erent intrinsic mutation rates as adaptations to their environment of interactions. We should expect to nd structures in the cell and genome for selectively allowing some genes to mutate faster than others. This may mean actively boosting the mutation rates. Conversely, it may simply mean that some genes are the subject of better replication and error correction mechanisms than other genes.
